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NOTES
Corporate Officer and Director Liability: Atherton v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: A Final
Resolution of the Issues Surrounding Section 1821(k) of
FIRREA
Introduction
As a general matter of corporate law, officers and directors owe a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty to the corporations they manage.' A breach of either of these
duties may subject the officer or director to personal liability for any damage caused
by the breach. In 1989, Congress adopted the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)2 to deal with the issue of personal
liability as applied to officers and directors of insolvent, federally chartered savings
institutions. Specifically, section 1821(k) of FIRREA3 states that directors and
officers can be held liable for gross negligence or intentional tortious conduct.
On the surface, the provision appears to establish a clear test for imposing
liability on former corporate executives.4 In reality, however, the meaning of
section 1821(k) has been anything but obvious. Since the promulgation of FIRREA,
courts confronting the issue of officer and director liability have been unable to
agree on the definite meaning of section 1821(k).5 The source of the dispute is the
ambiguous language of the statute, particularly the first and last sentences in the
provision Courts have differed in judgment as to whether the statute establishes
a national standard of care in all situations or whether it leaves room for the
application of certain state law or federal common law standards of liability.!
1. See Ronald R. Glancz & David S. Darland, Bank Director Liability in the Wake of FIRREA, in
FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 817 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7153,
1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 12
& 15 U.S.C.).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
4. See id.
5. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Director Liability Under FIRREA: Negligence and Gross Negligence
in the Courts, 48 CONsUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 77, 77 (1994) ("[The meaning of [section 1821(k)] was
called into doubt from the beginning by conflicting court decisions and commentary."); see also
Christopher T. Gorman, Liability of Directors and Officers Under FIRREA: The Uncertain Standard of
§ 1821(k) and the Need for Congressional Reform, 83 KY. LJ. 653, 654 (1995) ("[T]he language of §
1831(k) is ambiguous regarding the proper standard of care by which to evaluate the conduct of...
officers and directors."); Steven B. Price, FIRREA's Statute on the Standard of Liability for Bank
Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Textualisr, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 224
(1994) (finding that the language in § 1821(k) of FIRREA is subject to two interpretations).
6. See Beveridge, supra note 5, at 140; see infra notes 30, 81.
7. See FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 445 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992) (listing the district courts that are
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On January 14, 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in Atherton v. Federal
Depository Insurance Corp.,8 put an end to the disharmony. In Atherton, the Court
clarified the meaning of section 1821(k) by holding that the statute guarantees that
officers and directors of federally chartered savings institutions must meet at least
a gross negligence standard of care." The Court also held that the provision does
not preclude stricter state law standards making directors and officers liable for less
culpable conduct, such as simple or ordinary negligence."
This note examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Atherton and the potential
effects of the decision on corporate law in Oklahoma. Part I reviews the state of the
savings industry at the time Congress enacted F[RREA and the purposes behind the
adoption of the statute. Also, Part I specifically discusses section 1821(k) of
FIRREA in detail, focusing on the portions of the statute that have been the primary
cause of the dissension among the courts. Part H1 explores the law preceding the
Supreme Court's decision, describing the considerable disagreement among the
federal courts and explaining the reasoning behind the federal courts' differing
opinions. Part IHI recounts the facts of Atherton, the procedural background of the
case, and the Supreme Court's decision. Finally, Part IV of this note analyzes the
Court's opinion regarding the existence of any federal common law standard of
liability and its judgment regarding the preemption of state law. Part IV concludes
with an analysis of the implications of Atherton in general, and its effects on
Oklahoma law.
L Background Information
A. The Adoption of FIRREA
In the mid-1980,, the nation experienced a tremendous increase in the number of
bank and thrift failures." This "deluge of insolvencies" forced the federal
government to confront numerous claims brought by depositors whose savings had
been insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)." Initial
estimates indicated that the collapse of the industry would cost the federal treasury
split on the interpretation of§ 1821(k)); see also RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1244-45 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding § 1821(k) does not preempt state or federal common law); RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d
295,297 (10th Cir. 199.55) (holding § 1821(k) preempts federal common law); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d
416, 424 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding § 1821(k) preempts federal law); FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d
532, 540 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding § 1821(k) does not preempt state law).
8. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
9. See Atherton, .519 U.S. at 216.
10. See id
11. See Christopher S. Lam, Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp.: The State Law and
Federal Common Law Distinction, 41 VILL L. REv. 1035, 1035 n.2 (1996) (citing Paul T. Clark et al.,
Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAw. 1013 (1990)) (estimating the rate of bank failure increased three and one half
times from the rate in 1935 to the rate between 1980 to 1988); see also RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120,
1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding in the mid-1980s that banks were "failing like ninepins").





tens of billions of dollars in cleanup costs. 3 Later reports, however, revealed that
the cost of the savings and loan (S&L) crisis was more likely to total one trillion
dollars in damages. 4
In response to the crisis, the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
brought actions against former officers and directors of the failed institutions. 5 In
a majority of these failures, the dismal performance and mismanagement by
corporate executives largely contributed to the depository's downfall. 6 Congress
found that by holding the former officers and directors personally responsible for
their contribution to the damaged savings industry, the government could recoup
some of its loss. 7 During the 1980s, however, many states passed legislation
effectively insulating officers and directors from liability.'8 For instance, several
states adopted laws that impose liability only for intentional misconduct, willful or
wanton conduct, or similar behavior." The liability-relaxing statutes made it more
difficult for the government to hold directors and officers of the failed institutions
responsible, thereby decreasing the likelihood of the government relieving its
financial burden.
Finally, in 1989, Congress set out to remedy this situation. By adopting FIRREA,
Congress intended to "strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for
defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their depositors"' and
to "strengthen the enforcement powers of the federal regulators of depository
institutions.'. "To effectuate these purposes, Congress, for the first time, legislated
on the standard of liability governing claims against officers and directors of
federally chartered, federally insured depositories."'
13. See Gorman, supra note 5, at 653 (noting original estimates of savings and loan crisis near $100
billion).
14. See Banning K. Lary, Apres de Deluge: Cleaning Up After the S&L Mess, MGMT. REv., July
1990, at 24,24 ("S&L clean-up estimates have swelled from $100 billion to over $300 billion, climbing
toward the $1 trillion mark .... ").
15. See Graham K. Wells, FIRREA, State Law, and the Federal Financial Institution Director's Duty
of Care: The Case for an Exclusive Federal Cause of Action, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 395, 395
(1994).
16. See id.; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, An Evaluation of the Factors
Contributing to the Failure of National Banks: Phase II, 7 0CC Q.J. No. 3, 1988, at 1, 9.
17. See id (noting the FDIC and the RTC sued in response to the bank and thrift failures and now
continue to bring actions against hundreds of former officers and directors of the savings institutions
which subject the executives to personal liability and frequently lead to multi-million dollar verdicts and
settlements).
18. See Norwood P. Beveridge, Director Liability Under FIRREA Redux: Moving Towards a
Synthesis, 49 CONStMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 139, 139 (1995).
19. See Glancz & Darland, supra note 1, at 822 ("[B]road based concerns that [the ordinary prudent
person] standard operated as a substantial disincentive in attracting the best qualified candidates for
service as directors prompted many states to enact statutes that limited further the liability of
directors ... ").
20. Battin, supra note 12, at 2348 (quoting Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(10), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1811 (1994) (stating purposes of 1989 amendment))).
21. Id (quoting FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 & n.21 (M.D. La. 1992)).
22. Id. at 2348 (citing RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D. Mich. 1994)).
1999]
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B. Section 1821(k) of FIRREA
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k), the government may hold officers and directors of
failed financial institutions personally liable for the mismanagement of the
corporation.' This section specifically provides:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by, on behalf
of, or at the request of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted
wholly or partially for the benefit of the Corporation - (1) acting as
conservator o, receiver of such institution, (2) acting based on a suit,
claim, or cau:se of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise
conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or (3) acting based upon a
suit, claim, or cause of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise
conveyed in whole or in part by an insured depository institution or its
affiliate in connection with assistance provided under section 1823 of
this title, for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct
that demonstrates a greater disregard of duty of care (than gross
negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined under applicable State law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other
applicable law.m '
By enacting section 1821(k), Congress undoubtedly intended to preempt those state
law standards that prohibit the FDIC from pursuing claims against officers and
directors for gross regligence or less stringent conduct, such as simple or ordinary
negligence. It is unclear, however, if Congress intended to accomplish anything
further by enacting the statute. Interpreting the provision has proven troublesome
for many courts and legal commentators. ' One problem involves the courts'
difficulty agreeing on whether section 1821(k) preempts not only more culpable
state standards, but also state standards requiring only a showing of simple
negligenceY Furthermore, courts have been unable to reach an accord as to
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
25. See Battin, supra note 12, at 2349 (basing this conclusion on research of following case law and
commentary); see also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 412 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (concluding § 1821(k)
provides for actions against directors and officers for gross negligence, even though state law standards
of liability are more stringent); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W.D. La. 1991), affd, 995 F.2d
600 (5th Cir. 1993); Brttin, supra note 12, at 2349 n.16 (reasoning, based on this research, "[tlhe
practical effect is that the statute invalidates state 'insulating statutes,' which allow corporations to include
in their articles of incorporation provisions shielding directors form personal liability") (citing REv.
MODEL Bus. CORP. Act § 2.02(b)(4) (1994)); Beveridge, supra note 5, at 78 (concluding that courts
have reached agreement that the purpose of FIRREA was to displace state statutes that imposed liability
on officers and directors only for more culpable conduct, like simple negligence); Glancz & Darland,
supra note 1, at 823 (stating courts generally agree that FIRREA preempts state laws attempting to shield
directors from liability for more serious conduct).
26. See Lam, supra note 11, at 1036 (noting the ambiguous text of § 1821(k) has caused
disagreement regarding its interpretation).




whether section 1821(k) usurps any preexisting federal common law. The final
problem concerning section 1821(k) is that decisions have varied on the deter-
mination as to whether state law concerning directors applies to federally chartered
banks . '
The source of the inconsistent application of section 1821(k) lies in the language
of the statute. The last sentence of the provision, commonly referred to as the
"savings clause," is a primary source of much of the disagreement as to the meaning
of the statute.' The government relies on the "savings clause" for its assertion that
the statute does not create an exclusive standard of care. Rather, the government
argues that "other applicable law" encompasses the law of the United States and the
federal common law?' In contrast, defendant officers and directors generally
contend that the "savings clause" limits the right of the government to pursue claims
against officers and directors solely under the law of FIRREA, and not under any
other state law standard? According to this line of reasoning, the government is
confined to pursuing remedies under the statutory authority of FIRREA, and
therefore has no right to sue the defendant executives under state law or federal
common law.
Cir. 1992) ("Mhe lower courts are split on the question of the FDIC's ability to proceed against officers
and directors for simple negligence under state law."); see also FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 446 n.3
(10th Cir. 1992) (listing district court cases both supporting and opposing the application of state law
simple negligence standards to officers and directors of failed banks).
28. See Battin, supra note 12, at 2349 n.18 (comparing RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer,
840 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (holding § 1821(k) "does preempt RTC's state law [simple
negligence] claims"), with McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537 (en banc) (holding "state law claims premised
on lesser culpability [than the gross negligence standard in § 1821(k)] are not preempted by FIRREA")).
29. See id. at 2349-50 & n.21 (comparing RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 n.2 ("There is
nothing to suggest that officers... of federally chartered institutions ae only subject to federal causes
of action."), with RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (D. Utah 1993) ("[Federal law exclusively
governs the internal affairs of federal savings and loan associations, including director liability.")).
30. The "savings clause" reads: "Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994); see Battin, supra note 12, at 2349
("Due... to the ambiguous language of § 1821(k), especially the last sentence, or'savings clause', courts
have not been able to agree on a number of... issues."); see also Glancz & Darland, supra note 1, at
823 (noting that the "savings clause" has prompted extensive litigation).
31. See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting RTCs argument that the
"savings clause" specifically preserves actions under federal common law). But see FDIC v. Stahl, 89
F.3d 1510, 1515 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with FDIC that "Congress enacted the last sentence of the
statute to permit courts to decide whether to apply state law to federally chartered financial institutions");
FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir. 1992) (agreeing with FDIC's argument that "other
applicable law" means all other applicable laws such as state and federal common law standards).
32. In McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 538, the defendant-officers and directors argued that "other
applicable law" refers to the law of FIRREA, and that had Congress intended to safeguard the
government's rights to seek remedies under state law, it would have said so explicitly. Furthermore, in
Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447, the court dismissed the defendant-officer's suggestion that "other applicable
law" refers to the FDIC's powers in "other contexts," and that it applies only to other sections of FIRREA
itself.
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An additional source of conflict is the use of the word "may" in the first sentence
of section 1821(k)?3 Commonly, the officers and directors of the failed institutions
maintain that Congress' use of the word "may" illustrates its intent to limit actions
brought against them to a showing of "gross negligence."' On the other hand,
plaintiffs typically argue that the word "may" should not be construed as a
limitation, but as a permissive term, allowing the FDIC to proceed with claims
under state and federal common law as well as the federal statute.
II. The Development of Officer and Director Liability Under FIRREA
A. The Question of State Law Preemption
Officers and directors of insolvent financial institutions generally contend that
section 1821(k) of FIRREA preempts state law in its entirety and establishes a
national standard of liability.' Excluding the Sixth Circuit, which accepted this
argument in dicta, 7 courts dealing with this issue have held that section 1821(k)
only partially preempts state law. Specifically, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded that the
provision preempts state law only to the extent that state law standards are less
culpable than "gross negligence."39 Specifically, these courts have agreed that the
government may pursue state claims against former officers and directors under
state laws providing for simple or ordinary negligence.®
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits relied heavily on the "plain language" of the statute
to demonstrate that, contrary to the argument of defendant officers and directors,
Congress did not intend to authorize an exclusive standard of care' In Federal
33. See Battin, supra note 12, at 2356-57.
34. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 536 (illustrating officers interpreting "may" as a limitation on the
types of claims that the FDIC may pursue).
35. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537 (finding in accord with FDIC's argument that "[h]nd Congress
intended this authorizing provision to limit the FDIC to claims alleging gross negligence or greater
culpability, it would have inserted the word 'only' in the sentence"); see also RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d
1357, 1361 (5th Cir. 1994) (arguing if the first sentence of § 1821(k) were meant to be exclusive it
would have said "may only").
36. See Stahl, 89 F.3I at 1514; Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1359; Canfield, 967 F.2d at 445.
37. See Gaff v. FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1990) (reasoning the legislative history of §
1821(k) clearly expresses an intent to provide a uniform standard of liability across the nation); see also
Lam, supra note 11, at 1047 n.74 (noting, in support of its decision, the Gaffcourt quoted the legislative
history: "§ 1821(k) preempts State law.... The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross
negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of duty oftre"). The legislative history
is also quoted at H.R. CoIqF. REP. No. 101-222, at 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 437.
38. See LIam, supra note 11, at 1045.
39. See Stahl, 89 F.3d at 1516; Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446; McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537.
40. See Stahl, 89 F.3d at 1516; Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446; McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537.
41. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 539 ("[N]owhere does FIRREA indicate an aim to create national
uniformity in liability standards."); Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446 ("[T]he words used in § 1821(k) to describe





Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canfield,2 the Tenth Circuit began its analysis of the
statute's text by rejecting the defendants' interpretation of the word "may." 3 The
court concluded that "no reasonable construction of the word 'may' results in an
absolute limitation of the liability of officers and directors to instances of gross
negligence,"" and instead, found that "may" is a permissive term entitling the
FDIC to rely on stricter state law standards of negligence.4 The Ninth Circuit, in
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. McSweeney, joined the Tenth Circuit in
concluding that "[h]ad Congress intended this authorizing provision to limit the
FDIC to claims alleging gross negligence ... [it] would have inserted the word
'only' in the sentence.' 7
In evaluating the meaning of the "savings clause," both the Canfield and
McSweeney courts interpreted the last sentence of section 1821(k) as preserving the
government's right to pursue stricter state law causes of action against corporate
executives in a state where such actions are otherwise permissible.4 The defen-
dants in each case asserted that the phrase "other applicable law" refers not to other
state or federal law on this particular issue, but instead to the FDIC's power in
"other contexts," such as the FDIC's right to seek remedies other than personal
damages.49 Both courts, however, rejected this argument, finding that the pattern
of usage of the "savings clause, ' as well as the "evident" meaning of the phrase'
supports the determination that "other applicable law" includes stricter state law
standards of officer and director liability.
Finally, in their conclusions, the Ninth and Tenth Circuit courts described the
absurd effects of full state preemption.52 The Tenth Circuit in Canfield explained
that, under the defendants' interpretation of section 1821(k), the officer or director
of a troubled federally insured institution located in a state allowing action for
negligence, would have an incentive to allow the institution to fail.53 The court
42. 967 F.3d 443 (10th Cir. 1992).
43. In Canfield, the defendants argued that the use of the word "may" in the first sentence of the
provision results in an absolute limitation of the liability of officers and directors. Id. at 446.
44. Id.
45. See Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446.
46. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992).
47. Id. at 537.
48. Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446-47; see also McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 538.
49. Canfield, 967 F.3d at 447; see also McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 538.
50. The court in Canfield reasoned that as "a general rule of construction," the statute should be read
as a whole. Id. at 446. The court then looked at other parts of section 1821 and made three conclusions
concerning the pattern of the linguistic choices made by Congress: when the statute refers only to itself,
it does so specifically, and when the statute refers to the whole universe of other laws, it uses the same
language employed in section 1821(k). See id. As such, the court concluded that the pattern of usage
"runs squarely against the suggestion of the defendants that 'other applicable law' refers to the FDIC's
powers in 'other contexts.'" Id.
51. See Canfield, 967 F.3d at 446 ("In construing a statute, reliance must be placed on the...
statutes 'evident' meaning.") (citing Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974)). Accordingly,
the court found that "other applicable law" means "other applicable law." Id.
52. See Canfield, 967 F.3d at 449; McSweeney, 976 P.2d at 540.
53. Canfield, 967 F.3d at 449.
1999]
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stated, "[p]rior to failure, liability would attach for simple negligence. After failure,
liability would only attach if the officer or director could be proven grossly
negligent."'  As scch, the language of section 1821(k), and the possibility of
ludicrous results, convinced most courts that Congress did not intend to fully
preempt state law." Much of the debate in the federal court system, however,
concerns the question of whether the statutory provision displaces federal common
law standards for nagligence.
B. The Question of Federal Common Law Displacement
The ambiguous text of section 1821(k) has also been the source of dispute as to
whether the statute's standard of gross negligence supplants any preexisting common
law standard of officer and director liability." The majority of the district courts
have agreed with th, defendant officials that the provision commands displacement
of federal common law." Furthermore, the circuit courts have been inclined to
agree with the district courts' decisions." The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have all determined that Congress
"spoke directly" to the issue of director and officer liabilityM and effectively
supplanted federal common law.6' Like the courts dealing with the issue of state
law preemption, these circuit courts relied on the "plain language" of the statute to
support their conclusion.' Additionally, the courts relied on the legislative history
54. ld; see also McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540-41 ("We refuse to adopt a construction of FIRREA
that 'would indirectly encourage' officials to hasten the demise of a troubled thrift, contrary to the stated
intent of Congress 'to curtail ... activities of savings associations that pose unacceptable risks' to the
FDIC.") (quoting Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(3), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989)).
55. See Lam, supra note 11, at 1045-47.
56. See id. at 1048.
57. See id
58. See RTC v. Farraer, 823 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1993); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F. Supp. 722 (S.D.
Tex. 1992); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Il. 1991).
59. See RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 373 (6th
Cir. 1994); RTC v. Miranon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1364 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120 (7th
Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallrgher, 10 F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1994).
60. See, e.g., Frates, 52 F.3d at 297 (holding "[s]upersession [of federal law] involves the less
rigorous test of whether Congress 'spoke directly' to the matter in the statutory enactment"); Miramon,
22 F.3d at 1364 (concluding federal common law in the area of director and officer liability is preempted
"[a]s this statute 'speaks directly' to the issue").
61. See Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 419 ("In order to abrogate a common law principle, the statute must
'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law . . . .") (citing United States v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529, 534 (1993)); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1360 ("When Congress does speak to an issue previously
governed by federal common law, the need to resort to ... lawmaking by the federal courts disappears.")
(citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981)).
62. See Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361; Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 420 ("The plain language of § 1821(k)
'speaks directly' to the issue.., and establishes a gross negligence standard of liability for officers and
directors of failed financial institutions."). In RTC v. Gallagher, the government made the familiar
argument that section 1821(k)'s use of the term "may" permits action under state and federal common
law. Id. The Gallagher court rejected this argument finding that "[rlead in context, the word 'may' refers
to the right of the [RTC] to bring an action under this section. 'May' cannot reasonably be read to qualify




of the provision in making the determination that section 1821(k) displaced federal
common law.'
In contrast, the minority view is that federal common law actions against officers
and directors survive section 1821(k) even if those actions are based on laws
requiring less culpable conduct, such as simple negligence." These courts
determined that the "ambiguous statutory language does not specify Congress' intent
to preempt federal common law claims."' In other words, these courts determined
that the provision did not displace federal common law actions.' In light of the
967 F.2d 443, 450 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (Borby J., dissenting)); see also Miranwa, 22 F.3d at 1361
(finding the word "may" empowers the FDIC to bring cause of action under § 1821(k), but does not
qualify substantive part of statute). Additionally, the circuit courts interpreted the "savings clause" in
favor of the defendant officers and directors. Generally, the courts found that the last sentence of the
provision preserved only the government's ability to take other regulatory actions based on simple
negligence, but did not permit claims based on state or federal common law standards. See RTC v.
Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994); see also 12 U.S.C § 1818(b)-(g) (1994); Gallagher, 10
F.3d at 420 ("A better reading of the 'savings clause' is that it ... preserve[s] the RTC's ability to take
other regulatory actions based on simple negligence. For example, it preserves the RTC's power to
remove directors for simple negligence and its power to issue 'cease and desist' orders in cases of simple
negligence."). The court in Miramon, in rejecting the RTC's construction of the "savings clause," asked
itself, "Why would the RTC ever bring an action under section 1821(k), where it would have to prove
gross negligence, when it could bring an action under the federal common law and only be required to
prove simple negligence?" Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361.
63. See Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1362-63; Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421-22. In Miramon, the FDIC argued
that the legislative history of the statute contradicts the court's interpretations of § 1821(k). Miramon,
22 F.3d at 1362. The government relied heavily on a Senate report providing in part that § 1821(k)
does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or other applicable
Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution to be
sued 1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negligence, or 2) on an
alternative theory such as breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty.
S. REP. No. 101-19, at 318 (1989). But see FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The
legislative intent underlying director liability is insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the
statute."). The Miranmon court rejected this argument finding that the RTC did not "demonstrate the kind
of 'clearly expressed legislative intention' needed to overcome the plain meaning of the statute."
Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1363-64 (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 833-
34 (1990). The court in Miramon found that examination of all the legislative history, and inquiry into
the sequence of events leading up to the bill's passage, calls into question the conclusion of the Senate
report relied on by the government. Id. at 1362. In Gallagher, the court concluded that because the
Senate report was not available when the Senate initially voted on FIRREA, it was not entitled to
substantial weight. See Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421 (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n. 479 U.S. 388,
406-08 (1987)).
64. See Lam, supra note 11, at 1050 (citing RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding § 1821(k) does not displace federal common law)). With the exception of the Third Circuit's
decision, supra, this view only exists at the district court level. For examples of decisions concluding
that § 1821(k) does not displace federal common law simple negligence claims, see RTC v. Smith, 872
F. Supp. 805 (D. Or. 1995); RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1118 (W.D. Mo. 1993); RTC v. Hess,
820 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Utah 1993); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Okla. 1991). See also
Lam, supra note 11, at 1050 n.92 (citing the same and similar examples).
65. Lam, supra note 11, at 1051 & n.93 (citing FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill.
1992) (holding § 1821(k) does not preempt federal common law causes of action)).
66. See id. at 1051.
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confusion and inconsistent findings, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed the state preemption and federal displacement issues in Atherton v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'
III. Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
A. Facts
City Federal Savings Bank (City Federal) was a federally chartered, federally
insured savings institution located in Bedminster, New Jersey.' In December 1989,
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)' declared City Federal insolvent and
appointed the RTC as the bank's receiver." The RTC, in its capacity as receiver
for City Federal and its successors in receivership and conservatorship, filed suit
against several of the bank's former officers and directors.7 John W. Atherton, Jr.
was one of the former officers and directors targeted by the RTC. Mr. Atherton, at
various times, had served as Chief Operating Officer, Chairman, President, and
Chief Executive Officer of City Federal.'
In 1993, the RTC brought a civil action for money damages against Atherton and
five others alleging that these corporate officers were liable for breaching their duty
of care in connection with several unwise development, construction, and business
acquisition loans that resulted in losses to City Federal of more than $100 million."
Specifically, the RC claimed that these acts (or omissions) were unlawful because
they amounted to gross negligence, simple negligence, and breaches of fiduciary
duty.74
B. Procedural Bac,'ground
The RTC filed its original complaint, and its first amended complaint, in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey stating claims for
negligence, gross negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty under both state and
federal common law.75 Neither pleading asserted any claim based on section
1821(k) against Aftherton and the other defendants. 6 The defendants moved to
67. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
68. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Atherton (No. 95-928).
69. FIRREA created the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) within the Department of Treasury in
12 U.S.C. § 1462(a) of the Act. See Brief of Petitioner at 4, Atherton (No. 95-928). This provision
conferred upon the Director of the OTS the authority to charter and regulate federal savings associations.
See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(a), 1464(a) (1994).
70. On December31, 1995, the RTC terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Resolution
Trust Corporation Completion Act, 12 U.S.C. § 144la(m)(1) (1994). The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation succeeded the Resolution Trust Corporation in its capacity as receiver. See Brief for
Respondent at 6-7, Atherton (No. 95-928).
71. See id. at 2.
72. See id.
73. See id.; Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1997).
74. See Brief for Respondent at 2.





dismiss the RTC's complaint arguing that section 1821(k) of FIRREA established
a mandatory standard of gross negligence in suits against officers and directors of
failed savings institutions. The RTC conceded that its state law claim against the
defendants was invalid, based on its belief that state law was not applicable to
federally chartered institutions.'5 The RTC argued, however, that the "savings
clause" of section 1821(k) preserved the right to proceed with its federal common
law claim.' The district court granted the defendants' motions and dismissed the
RTC's first amended complaint to the extent that it alleged liability based on
standards other than that set forth in section 1821(k) of FIRREA.' The district
court held that the statute set forth a uniform federal gross negligence standard
applicable to the situation at issue, thus prohibiting the government from bringing




Subsequently, the RTC filed a second amended complaint asserting claims against
Atherton and the other defendants based solely on section 1821(k).' In addition,
the RTC moved to certify the district court's ruling on the standard of liability issue
for immediate appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.'
The Third Circuit granted the RTC's request for interlocutory review' and reversed
the district court's order dismissing the RTC's claims against Atherton and the other
City Federal defendants.' Rejecting the district court's judgment that Congress
intended section 1821(k) to establish a uniform standard of liability, the Third
Circuit held that the enactment of FIRREA did not limit the RTC to federal claims
under the federal statute's gross negligence standard.' Moreover, the Third Circuit
concluded that section 1821(k) does not preempt the government's right to sue the
officers and directors of failed banks under state law claims for ordinary or simple
negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty."
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. The RTC asserted that the federal common law standard of liability is simple or ordinary
negligence. See id.
80. See Brief for Petitioner at 6.
81. See id. The district court further held that the RTC had effectively dismissed its state law
claims; thus, it did not deal with this aspect of the issue.
82. See id.
83. See id. On appeal, the RTC did not challenge the district court's ruling that the RTC had
withdrawn its state law claims. See id.
84. See id. The court of appeals consolidated the appeal with an interlocutory appeal that had been
filed by other defendants in an unrelated suit brought by the RTC as receiver for the United States
Savings and Loan of Trenton, New Jersey (United Savings). See Brief for Respondent at 4, Atherton (No.
95-928). Because United Savings was a state chartered institution, the negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty claims that the RTC asserted were based on New Jersey law. See id. The district court in the United
Savings case had rejected the defendants' argument that section 1821(k) preempted the RTC's ability to
assert state law claims. See id.
85. See RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1235 (1995).
86. See id. at 1242.
87. See id. at 1244 ("Congress did not intend to hinder the RTC by denying it an opportunity to
recover for instances of director and officer negligence when shareholders of these institutions would
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Following the Third Circuit's decision, the City Federal defendants petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari.' Thereafter, five of the six defendants
settled with the government and withdrew from the case, leaving Atherton as the
sole petitioner."
C. The Decision
In Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,' the Supreme Court focused
its efforts on determining once and for all where courts should look to find the
standard of care to measure the legal propriety of the conduct of former officers and
directors of failed institutions. The Court discussed whether courts should look to
state law, to federal common law, or to the federal statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).",
Justice Breyer, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court, discussed with detail and
clarity the reasons supporting the Court's decision to vacate the circuit court's
judgment.'
To begin its analysis, the Court temporarily set aside the federal "gross
negligence" standard in order to determine whether, in the absence of such a law,
federal common law would provide the applicable standard." The Court, quoting
O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.,.' stated that "normally,
when courts decide to fashion rules of federal common law, 'the guiding principle'
is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of
state law ...must first be specifically shown."" Accordingly, the Court deter-
mined that a federal standard of common law liability applicable to officers and
directors of failed depositories exists only in the event that the "application of state
law standards of care to such banks would conflict with, and thereby significantly
threaten, a federal policy or interest."'
In support of a federal common law standard, the FDIC made four arguments.'
First, the FDIC invoked the need for uniformity." The government argued that a
have had a right under state law, before receivership, to bring such an action on behalf of the
corporation."). State law preemption became an issue for the court's review on appeal as a result of the
consolidation of the United Savings case with City Federal.
88. See Atherton 'v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 213 (1997).
89. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Atherton (No. 95-928).
90. 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
91. See id. at 215-16.
92. See id. at 215-31.
93. See id. at 216. This part of the opinion relied heavily upon early Supreme Court decisions
defining boundaries of federal common law. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)
("[C]ases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule would be justified ... are... 'few and
restricted.'") (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (finding "whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state
law is primarily a decission for Congress," not the federal courts); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 364 U.S. 64,
78 (1938) ("There is nj general federal common law.").
94. 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
95. Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218.
96. d. at 218.
97. See id. at 219-23.




federal common law "will provide uniformity, but [s]uperimposing state standards
of fiduciary responsibility . ..would . . . 'upset the balance' that the federal
chartering authority 'may strike .... ."' The Court rejected this argument, finding
that the FDIC failed to show an obvious federal concern for uniformity among
liability standards." Second, the FDIC suggested that the courts should apply a
federal common law standard of care simply because the banks at issue are federally
chartered.' The Court concluded that federal banks are customarily subject to the
laws of the states, and thus, a federal charter itself demonstrates "no conflict, threat,
or need for 'federal common law.""'
The Court's opinion then discussed the FDIC's third argument which concerned
the "internal affairs doctrine.""1n Here, the government argued that because states
normally look to the laws of the state of incorporation for the relevant corporate
governance standard of care, courts should look to federal common law to determine
the standard governing officers and directors of federally chartered banks."' The
Court immediately discounted this argument and concluded that the internal affairs
doctrine shows no need for federal common law."'5 For that reason, the Court
found that the argument does not support the existence of federal common law."
Finally, in its last effort to establish the existence of a federal common law, the
FDIC pointed to statutes providing the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) with "the
authority to fine or remove from office savings bank officers and directors for
certain breaches of fiduciary duty.""'7 The FDIC argued that in "the course of such
proceedings, the OTS, applying the ordinary-care standard [of negligence] ... has
spoken authoritatively respecting the duty of care owed by directors and officers to
federal savings associations."" The Court, however, declined to find in favor of
the government." The opinion stated that the FDIC failed to make the claim that
99. lit; Brief for Respondent at 23, Atherton (No. 95-928) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 103 (1991)).
100. See id. at 220-21.
101. See id. In response to this assertion, the Court commenced a fairly extensive discussion of the
development of the nation's dual banking system, concluding that state law has, for some time, applied
to federally chartered banks. See id. at 220-223.
102. ld. at 223.
103. See id. at 223-24 (The Court described the internal affairs doctrine as "a conflict of laws
principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority to regulate a corporation's
internal affairs - matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors, and shareholders - because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands.") (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,645 (1982)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 309 (1971).
104. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 224 ("Mhis argument ... is to substitute analogy for formal
symmetry for the controlling legal requirement, namely, the existence of a need to create federal common
law arising out of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest.") (citing O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994)).
105. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 224.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 23-25, Atherton (No. 95-928).
109. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 224.
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the OTS's statements, allegedly interpreting a preexisting judge-made federal law,
amounted to an agency effort to create a binding regulation."" Furthermore, the
Court's own examination of the OTS opinions failed to introduce any convincing
evidence of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest."' Thus, in ap-
proximately four pages of analysis, the Supreme Court resolved the issue of federal
common law displacement by holding that there is no federal common law creating
a general standard of care applicable to former officers and directors of insolvent
federal savings irstitutions."'
After eliminating the possible existence of federal common law, the Court turned
to the issue of state law preemption to determine whether section 1821(k)
establishes an exclusive standard of liability for "gross negligence."". Ultimately,
the Court held that the statute's "gross negligence" standard provided only a floor -
a guarantee that officers and directors must meet at least a gross negligence standard
before facing liability."' The Court found, however, that the standard does not
stand in the way of stricter state law standards, such as simple or ordinary
negligence."'
In the final portion of the opinion, the Court discussed one final argument made
by Atherton in support of full state preemption."6 The petitioner, conceding that
section 1821(k) of FIRREA applies to both federal and state banks, asked the court
to assume that, in the absence of the federal statute, federal common law would
determine liability for federal banks."' Atherton then urged the Court to consider
why Congress would have applied the "gross negligence" standard to federal banks
unless it intended the statute to set an absolute standard."' Atherton reasoned,
relying on the assumption that federal common law would hold directors and
officers to a standard as strict, if not stricter than, gross negligence, that the FDIC
would never have any reason to bring suit under section 1821(k)." ' The Court
made reference to the creativity of the petitioner's reasoning, yet determined that the
argument's critical assumption - the existence of a federal common law stan-
dard - runs contrary to the Court's finding that there is no preexisting federal
common law standard,' and that state law applies to these federally insured
institutions. Without that assumption, the Court stated, it is clear that the gross
negligence "floor" is needed to limit state efforts to insulate officers and directors
from liability and that a gross-negligence floor serves that purpose.''
110. See U
111. See id.
112. See iU at 26.
113. See id. The defendant in Atherton argued that the "any right" language of section 1281(k)'s
"savings clause" "means only a right created elsewhere in the same Act." Id. at 228.
114. See id. at 22.7.
115. See id.









IV. Analysis of the Atherton Court's Decision
A. Ruling Out the Existence of a Preexisting Common Law Standard
In the past, several circuit courts have concluded that section 1821(k) of FIRREA
displaces federal common law standards for bank director or officer liability."
The Third Circuit, on the other hand, has found that the federal statute does not
supplant the federal common law." However, the appellate courts have all agreed
that a federal common law standard for director and officer liability does exist,
regardless of whether section 1821(k) displaces the standard. Nevertheless, the
United States Supreme Court essentially nullified these cases in Atherton by ruling
out the existence of a federal common law corporate governance standard."
The decision denying the existence of a federal common law standard is perhaps
the most well-supported determination made by the Atherton Court.' In 1994, the
Supreme Court in O'Melveny & Myers" held that "there is no general federal
common law," and no basis for creating special federal judge-made rules of decision
simply to enhance recoveries in failed thrift receivership litigation.'" In the
appellate level decisions, the courts noted that federal common law is a creature of
the federal judiciary and applies only in limited instances when there is a significant
conflict between federal policy and the use of state law;'" yet, these courts
neglected to determine whether a conflict actually existed creating a need for a
common law standard. Similarly, the Third Circuit in Atherton cited O'Melveny &
Myers in its opening legal analysis, but apparently failed to recognize the
persuasiveness of the case when deciding that there existed a federal common law
standard of liability'" Unfortunately, the Third Circuit, as well as the other
appellate courts, wasted considerable time attempting to ascertain whether FIRREA
displaced or supplanted federal common law, rather than determining whether there
was ever any basis for creating federal common law in the first place.'
122. See RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1360
(5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d
416, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1993).
123. See RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1242 (1994) (holding § 1821(k) of FIRREA
does not displace federal common law standards of simple or ordinary negligence).
124. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 217-26.
125. See id.
126. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
127. 1I at 83 (quoting Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
128. See RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416,
419 (7th Cir. 1993).
129. In RTCv. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit relied on Briggs
v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 145-46 (1891), in holding that there was a standard of care applicable to
officers and directors as a matter of federal common law. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1247 n. 16. The Court
acknowledged that the Briggs case was decided before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), in
which the Supreme Court rejected the existence of any general federal common law. See Erie, 304 U.S.
at 78. The Court in O'Melveny & Myers, relying on Erie, promptly rejected any notion that there is a
general federal common law. O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 84. As such, the appellate court in
Atherton erroneously relied on Briggs as support for its finding of a federal common law standard of
bank director and officer liability.
130. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational
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Unlike the circuit courts, the Supreme Court went straight to the heart of the
matter. From the beginning, it acknowledged that federal common law exists only
in the "few and restricted" cases where there is a conflict between state law and a
federal interest, and therefore, wasted no time on the issue of displacement.' As
a result, the Court accurately determined that the FDIC failed to show any
significant threat to a federal interest." The government's argument that state law
standards of liability conflicted with the need for uniformity did not successfully
persuade the Court. For one, the Court reasoned that to invoke the concept of
uniformity is not to prove its need.' Therefore, the FDIC needed to show an
obvious federal ccncem for uniformity among liability standards. The respondent,
however, failed to do so, and the Court correctly concluded that the uniformity
argument must fail.M The Court rejected the uniformity argument finding that
because the number of federally insured banks is almost equally divided between
federally chartered and state chartered banks, 3s and a federal standard that
increases uniformity among the former will decrease uniformity among the
latter." Further, the Court reasoned that disparities in matters of corporate
governance have existed for quite some time with no noticeable negative impact on
any federal interest.' Consider, for example, the divergent state law standards
applicable to banks chartered in different states."t Under Oklahoma law, directors
and officers are not liable unless conduct constitutes at least "gross negligence, or
willful or intentional misconduct,"'3 while in Iowa, the law requires only a
showing of "ordinary negligence.""1e)
Furthermore, the fact that a savings institution is federally chartered in no way
justifies the application of any uniform federal common law standard in determining
the liability of officers and directors. 4' A federal charter does not produce a need
for uniformity regarding an issue that falls squarely within two traditional areas of
Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 9, Atherton (No. 95-928).
131. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. at 218 (citing O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87).
132. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 217-26.
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979) (rejecting
generalized pleas for uniformity)).
134. See Atherlon, 519 U.S. at 220-21.
135. See id (citing FDIC, STATISTICS ON BANKING: A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES BANKING INDUSTRY tbl. SI-9, at B-9 (1995) (showing in 1989, there were 1595 federally
chartered institutions and 1492 state-chartered institutions)).
136. See id. at 220. Moreover, the Court recognized that "our nation's banking system has prospered
despite disparities in matters of corporate governance" and, therefore, was unpersuaded by the argument
for uniformity. Id.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (West 1994) (Directors not liable unless
conduct constitutes at least "willful misconduct or recklessness."), cited in Atherton, 510 U.S. at 220;




139. See 6 OKLA. STAT. § 712 (1991).
140. See IOWA CODE § 524.605 (1995).




state law - tort law and corporate law.' Congress, in section 1821(k), clearly
expressed its preference for the use of "applicable State law" to define "gross
negligence,"'43 thereby evidencing its view that there does not exist any overriding
federal policy in favor of a uniform standard of liability)"
Additionally, the Court relied on considerable precedent to accurately conclude
that state law is applicable to federally chartered banks.145 Since 1869, the Court
has continually found that federal banks are subject to the laws of the states." In
National Bank v. Commonwealth, the Court stated that federal banks "are subject
to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more
by the laws of the State than of the nation. ''47
Furthermore, the Atherton Court was correct in pointing out that the respondent's
reference to the internal affairs doctrine did not demonstrate the need for a federal
common law standard of liability governing claims against bank directors and
officers.' 4 The argument urged by the FDIC in support of the internal affairs
doctrine was that applying the doctrine will ensure that, where savings institutions
are engaged in multistate lending activities, their directors and officers will not be
subject to conflicting state fiduciary requirements. 49  The Seventh Circuit in
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chapman held that the internal affairs doctrine mandated
application of federal law to the internal affairs of a federal institution. 5 Contrary
to the Chapman majority, the Atherton Court held that this argument does not
amount to the required showing of a "significant interest."'' The Atherton Court's
reasoning is sound. First, the Court pointed out that the purpose of the internal
affairs doctrine is to avoid conflict by requiring that there be a single point of legal
reference." In cases involving the internal affairs of state banks, the laws of the
state of incorporation will apply. Federally chartered banks, however, are not
incorporated in any state and therefore have no natural point of legal reference.
142. See id. at 13.
143. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994) ("A director or officer... may be held personally liable...
for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of
duty of care .... as such terms are defined and determined under applicable State law.") (emphasis
added).
144. See id.; see also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946)
(finding where part of a regulatory scheme relies on state law, the "assumption" that uniformity is
necessary cannot be made).
145. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 222-23.
146. See id.
147. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869).
148. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 223. The Atherton Court continued by citing several more Supreme
Court cases with essentially the same holding. See, e.g., Anderson Natl Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233,
248 (1944) ("National banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking
laws or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks' functions."); First Natl Bank v.
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) ("[National banks] are subject to the laws of a State in respect of
their affairs .... ").
149. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 223-24.
150. RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994).
151. Atherton, 510 U.S. at 225.
152. See id.
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Considering, however, that state law applies to these banks, the potential
complication is easily obviated. The Atherton majority aptly suggested that, in
absence of federal common law, the federally chartered bank could simply look to
the law of the state where it has its "main office or maintains its principal place of
business,"'" thereby effectively establishing a single point of legal reference.
This is a well-reasoned decision. Consider, for example, the situation where the
main branch of a federally chartered bank and a state chartered bank sit across the
street from each other in State X. Further assume that the state chartered bank is
incorporated in State X. Using the Atherton Court's reasoning, any internal conflict
within either of these banks would be settled by the laws of State X. Consequently,
the disparity between federally chartered and state chartered banks would tend to
decrease, because there would not be the problem of state and federal law conflict.
Moreover, the internal affairs doctrine is a conflicts of law doctrine which does not
assist in determining questions of conflict between state and federal law. The
doctrine concerns the issue of choice of law as between states, not between federal
or state law."
B. The Court's Decision Regarding State Law Preemption
The United Statels Supreme Court joined the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
by concluding that section 1821(k) does not prevent the FDIC from bringing actions
against officers and directors under state law standards of gross negligence or
stricter standards such as ordinary or simple negligence.5 The result is that
officers and directors of failed financial institutions may be held personally liable
for mismanagement under section 1821(k)'s standard of gross negligence in any
state in which the law requires a showing of more culpable conduct. On the other
hand, if the state law requires only a showing of ordinary or simple negligence,
there is no reason to invoke the federal statute's gross negligence standard because
the government may sue under the state law.
The Atherton Court based its state law preemption conclusion on the plain
language of the statute."5 In answering the preemption question, the Court first
looked at the statute's "savings clause" and determined that the language, when
"read naturally, suggests an interpretation broad enough to save rights provided by
other state, or federal, law." '57 As a result, the statute's evident meaning clearly
preserves the applicability of stricter state standards, such as simple negligence.
Furthermore, the Court found that the background of the statute as a whole
supports the conclusion that Congress intended to preserve the federal government's
ability to recover funds by creating a standard-of-care floor."' The Court pointed
153. Id. at 224.
154. See id.
155. See FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1516 (1lth Cir. 1996); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.3d 443,446
(10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1992).
156. See id. at 227-28.
157. Id. at 227.
158. See Atherton, 510 U.S. at 227; see also Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974)




to FJRREA's legislative history, indicating that Congress continually referred to the
harm "liability-relaxing" state statutes had caused the federal government, and
ultimately, the taxpayer."" The Court's conclusion that section 1821(k) does not
preempt stricter state standards is correct; if Congress intended FIRREA to mandate
a national standard of care, the problem of "liability-relaxing" state regulation would
have only been solved in those instances where state law was weaker, but the
problem would have been aggravated in states where the law was stronger.'"
The Court acknowledged, nonetheless, that the legislative history of section
1821(k) is not entirely consistent with the Court's conclusion.'' The Congres-
sional Record contains one statement suggesting that the purpose of the statute is
to protect bank officers and directors from strict liability standards, such as simple
negligence." This sole statement, however, failed to persuade the Court that
FIRRA created a national standard of care.'"
C. Implications of Atherton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Atherton, the states retain the authority
to enact statutes regarding the personal liability of directors and officers of savings
associations. The only limitation is that these state standards may not fall below a
standard of gross negligence; if so, the state law will be preempted by section
1821(k) of FIRREA. The Court's decision provides states with the option to adopt
statutes that will provide greater accountability for officers and directors and further
safeguard the system, or to adopt less stringent standards effectively offering more
protection to bank officials.
As such, one potential argument against the Atherton decision is that, by
preserving the applicability of stricter state standards, "the majority's interpretation
of section 1821(k) contravenes the long recognized need to attract and retain bright,
ambitious community leaders to serve as officers and directors."'"M In other words,
meaning). The defendant, in contending that the statute displaces federal common law, argues that "any
right" means only a right created elsewhere in the same Act of Congress, for example, by various
regulatory enforcement provisions. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 227.
159. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 228-29. The opinion pointed to Senate reports and Congressional
Record statements illustrating the legislature's intent only to preempt state laws that tend to shield officers
and directors from liability. Id.; see also 135 CONG. REc. 7150-51 (1989) ("Mhe establishment of a
Federal standard of care is based on the overriding Federal interest in protecting the soundness of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fund and is very limited in scope. It is not a wholesale
preemption of long-standing principles of corporate governance .... ") (statement of Sen. Riegle); S.
REP. No. 101-19, at 318 (1989).
160. See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 228-29.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. (supporting "provisions relating to State laws affecting the liability of officers and
directors of financial institutions" because "these changes are essential if we are to attract qualified
officers and directors to serve our financial institutions") (citing 135 CONG. REC. 7150 (1989) (statement
of Sen. Sanford)). The Court was undeterred by this statement because "it suggests an interpretation
largely rejected in lower courts" and it is "inconsistent with the language of the Senate Report." Id. at
675-76 (referring to S. REP. No. 101-19, supra note 63).
164. FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 451 (10th Cir. 1992) (Borby J., dissenting). The Supreme
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it is possible that states in which the law requires only a showing of simple
negligence will have a difficult time persuading qualified business people to work
for savings associations in that state.
In light of this argument, the Tenth Circuit, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
v. Canfield,"5 stated that "Congress left it to the states to decide the propriety of
a simple negligence standard."'" In reaching that decision, "a state may well
choose to consider the difficulty in obtaining liability insurance, and the need to
attract those people . . . [that] will not accept directorships under a simple
negligence standard.'' 67 Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Atherton
provides states with the power to legislate on the issue of bank director and officer
liability, giving them the freedom to balance state interests and provide for those
interests in their laws. Accordingly, each state has the autonomy to determine
whether it wants to hold directors to a more lenient standard of gross negligence,
which would likely attract more officers and directors to the state, or whether the
state wants to impose a strict state standard, such as simple negligence, to protect
the savings industry from officer and director mismanagement.
In 1992, Oklahoma adopted a statute addressing the issue of liability for directors
and officers of failed financial institutions. Title 6, section 712(c) of the Oklahoma
Statutes specifically provides:
[n]o claim or action seeking to recover money damages shall be brought
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Resolution Trust
Corporation or other banking regulatory agency against any director or
officer, including any former director or officer, of any insured financial
depository institution as defined in the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, unless such claim or action
arises out of the gross negligence, or willful or intentional misconduct
of such officer or director during his term of office with such insured
financial institution. 't
Before the enactment of this statute, Oklahoma common law permitted actions
against bank directors and officers to be maintained when these officials failed to
execute their duties with ordinary care and diligence.' Section 712(c), however,
effectively raised the standard of proof from ordinary, or simple negligence, to gross
Court found that the statement in the Congressional Record is inconsistent with the language of the
Senate report and suggests an interpretation "largely rejected in the lower courts," namely that it creates
a mandatory standard of liability across the board. Id. at 230.
165. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992).
166. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 451.
167. Id. at 448.
168. 6 OKLA. STAT. § 712(c) (1991).
169. See RTC v. Wright, 868 F. Supp. 301, 303 (W.D. Okla. 1993) ("At common law, a bank
director has the duty to act in good faith and with ordinary care and diligence when conducting the
bank's affairs. Bank directors are liable for losses which could have been prevented by the exercise of




negligence, thereby providing greater protection from liability to officers and
directors of the failed institution t"O
It is notable that, as enacted in 1992, Oklahoma's section 712(c) changed not only
the standard of proof required for future actions brought by the government, but also
in actions pending at the time the statute was adopted."" Essentially, the statutory
provision retroactively destroyed the government's right to sue defendants under the
Oklahoma common law simple negligence standard in actions arising prior to the
statute's enactment." Consequently, several federal district courts agreed that
section 712(c) violates the Oklahoma Constitution which prohibits the legislature
from taking away a cause of action that has already commenced.' " As such, all
causes of actions that accrued before the enactment of the statute are subject to a
simple negligence standard for liability. Section 712(c)'s gross negligence standard,
however, still applies prospectively in cases brought by the government against
officers and directors of insolvent financial institutions.
Considering that Oklahoma was not one of those states having enacted "liability-
relaxing" laws to shield bank officials, the Atherton decision has little, if any,
impact in the state. Five years before the Supreme Court's decision, the Oklahoma
Legislature had already decided to hold officers and directors to a minimum
standard of gross negligence. If the Oklahoma law had been more protective of
bank officials, Atherton would have required the state to change its standard, or else
be preempted by FIRREA section 1821 (k)'s gross negligence standard. The Atherton
decision, however, does not require Oklahoma to amend its law because the state
standard does not fall below the standard-of-care floor which the Court determined
Congress established by enacting FIRREA. Accordingly, as "other applicable law"
under section 1821(k), any suit brought by the FDIC against an officer or director
of a failed financial institution must be based on a theory of gross negligence, as
such terms are defined by the state.
Conclusion
In rendering its decision in Atherton v. FDIC, the United States Supreme Court
finally resolved an extremely muddled area of corporate governance. According to
the Court, the proper interpretation of FIRREA section 1821(k) is that Congress
intended only to preempt state laws setting a standard for director and officer
liability lower than gross negligence, as defined by applicable state law. By holding
170. See Wright, 868 F. Supp. at 304.
171. See id.
172. See id. Section 712(c) explicitly refers to claims maintained by the government after Aug. 9,
1989. However, the section was not given effect until July 1, 1992. See id. at 305. As such, the statute
attempts to destroy the right of the government to maintain suits on a basis stricter than gross negligence,
a right that existed under the common law prior to the statute's enactment. See id.
173. See id.; see also OKLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 54 ("The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute
previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty incurred,
or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (Oklahoma Due
Process Clause); RTC v. Alexander, No. CIV-92-507-T, 1993 WL 761299 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1993);
RTC v. Conner, 871 F. Supp. 1424 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
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that section 1821(k) of FIRREA acts as a "floor" under which corporate liability
standards may not fall, the Court effectively removed the ability of officers and
directors of failed financial institutions to shield themselves from personal liability
for mismanagement in many states. As a result, it is less difficult, at least in some
states, for the government to hold these corporate officials personally accountable
for some of the damages suffered by financial institutions in the event of
insolvency.
The implications of the Supreme Court's decision on Oklahoma state law are
minimal. Oklahoma law regarding the liability of bank directors and officers
requires a showing cf gross negligence. Section 1821(k) of FIRREA, therefore, does
not preempt the law of the state. Thus, in the event the FDIC seeks to recover
money damages from a bank director or officer in Oklahoma, the government must
show that the executive was grossly negligent in his management of the savings
institution.
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